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Semantics and/versus ontology
Who or what can be free, or not free? The question 
may seem mind-boggling on close inspection. To the 
extent that meaning is defined through reference, or 
acts of naming, different meanings of freedom deployed 
in daily life derive their significance from specific and 
contingent instructions that allow the particularities of 
freedom to be constituted. Hence, determining the 
everyday meaning of freedom involves an analysis of 
practical power effects, as well as the struggles over 
which instructions, or policies, should be followed in 
order to determine who and what falls under the cate-
gory of ‘the free’, and what or who should be excluded 
from it. So we must begin by exposing ourselves to 
what Malinowski called the ‘universe of semantic chaos’ 
in which ‘freedom’ appears if we are to hope to approach 
freedom itself (1947). Further, this article argues that 
in order to address the complexities of freedom to their 
limits, an exploration not only of semantics (considera-
tions of meaning) but also of its relation to ontology 
(considerations of existence) cannot be neglected.
What possible definition of freedom could anthro-
pologists provide that adequately combines semantic 
and ontological aspects taking most advantage of the 
possibilities fostered by ethnographic research 
methods? To begin with we suggest that it helps to 
make certain ‘pre-theoretical’ commitments more 
explicit: what is the presupposed relationship between 
freedom, the particular languages in which fieldwork is 
conducted, the act of translation, and the different 
ontologies indexed?
Notice how the following description of the Pintupi 
of the Western Australian Desert, extracted from its 
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ethnographic context, might be understood to apply 
almost anywhere: 
‘Pintupi life is highly personalized; for people to 
abstract from the intimate and familiar is unusual. 
They place emphasis on individuals, their autonomy, 
and their capacity to choose courses of action’ (Myers 
1992: 18). 
To take a quite different example, the Confucian 
concept ziyou – if we are able momentarily to ignore 
radical differences of social scale and hierarchy – has a 
more than passing resemblance to those Pintupi prin-
ciples. Ziyou is often glossed as ‘freedom’, but fits well, 
arguably better, with ‘autonomy’ since, literally, ziyou 
translates from Chinese as ‘self-follow’, a principle, in 
other words, of following one’s own route (Li 2014). As 
with the Pintupi, however, the kind of autonomy 
involved is understood to unfold out of a traditional 
range of values. And herein lies a problem – ‘autonomy’ 
may seem to cover similar territory to ‘freedom’, and 
‘autonomy’ may appear to be replayed across different 
social settings, but perhaps this is an illusion created by 
our attempts at translation.
Take a different example, the Hindi term swaraj, 
which is likewise often glossed as ‘freedom’, was 
co-opted during the struggle for Indian independence 
to mean both ‘self-rule’ and ‘home rule’ (with resulting 
ambiguities). For Ghandi, swaraj meant independence 
from colonial power, but had the deeper implication of 
cultivating capacities for personal self-governance as 
opposed to relinquishing control of oneself to the state 
(there are echoes of Kant here). In Ghandi’s view, as 
with Malinowski in Freedom and Civilization, the only 
means to counter-balance state coercion was through 
existing practices of voluntary association; the free life 
of the fellow villager. Swaraj would not be achieved 
merely by transferring power to an independent Indian 
government (1910). All this suggests that the meaning 
of swaraj was not beyond debate. Either way, the matter 
turns out to be more complicated since the prefix sva in 
swaraj, though it suggests a personal pronoun, does not 
translate directly as ‘self ’ – instead it is closer to ‘own’, 
hence its bifurcating use to mean both ‘self ’ and ‘home’. 
Vaidyanathan has therefore argued that, rather than 
‘self-rule’, a truer translation of swaraj into English 
may be ‘proper rule’ which paradoxically has the poten-
tial to mean the opposite of either freedom or autonomy 
(Vaidyanathan 1989). Note that αὐτός in ancient Greek 
means ‘self ’ but also ‘same’: Orlando Patterson (1991) 
has argued that the Greek understanding of ‘self ’ and 
hence the idea of self-governance evolved dialectically 
from the distinction between slaves who were ruled, 
and citizens who ruled themselves.
During Lino e Silva’s fieldwork in one of the largest 
Brazilian slums, his interlocutors almost never used the 
word ‘freedom’ in their daily lives. Since the ethnog-
raphy was conducted in Portuguese, people spoke of 
‘liberdade’, ‘liberada’, ‘libertação’ and not of ‘freedom’. 
This may sound like an obvious point, but many diffi-
culties arise from it. Peter Gow (in Lino e Silva and 
Wardle 2016) notes the various candidates for trans-
lating what we might take to be an antonym of ‘freedom’ 
– ‘slavery’ – amongst the Piro. Each of these meanings 
has valences, including notions of kinship affiliation, 
absent from the liberal understanding of slavery, he 
argues. As we will see, in English ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ 
can be subtly incommensurable. In other languages, 
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such as Portuguese, the challenge is the opposite: ‘liber-
dade’ could mean both ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’.
In fact, theorising the indeterminacy of translation 
could help to further our ontological understanding of 
freedom. If we accept the position defended by Williard 
von Quine (1981), who argues that no translation is 
ever absolutely determined, the awareness that ‘freedom’ 
is not, for example, isomorphic with, for example, ‘liber-
dade’ seems to become both clearer and also less prob-
lematic. Quine (ibid.: 23) explains that this indetermi-
nacy reflects the fact that ‘two conflicting manuals of 
translation can both do justice to all dispositions of 
behaviour, and that, in such case, there is no fact of the 
matter of which manual is right’. To that extent, 
‘freedom’ is understood as an imprecise translation of 
‘liberdade’. The expectation, however, is that the repli-
cation of ethnographic instances in which the word 
‘liberdade’ is put into practice in ‘the field’ may help to 
reduce some of this unavoidable indetermination, so 
that an equivalence between the two terms can be more 
precisely delineated by each one of us, even if never 
completely resolved. Quine (ibid.: 20) reminds us: ‘The 
translation adopted arrests the free-floating reference 
of the alien terms only relatively to the free-floating 
reference of our own terms, by linking the two’.
In her 2007 essay ‘Alternative Freedoms’, Caroline 
Humphrey gives centrality to the problem of transla-
tion. Humphrey intentionally brackets off discussions 
regarding what philosophers have had to say about 
freedom. Instead, she emphasizes how some people in 
Russia, with whom she had been working for years, 
referred to ideas similar to ‘freedom’. In Humphrey’s 
(2007: 1) words: 
‘I want to use our word ‘freedom’ – whose multiple 
meanings will be implicit and left to your imagina-
tions – to elicit, as it were, a range of ideas held in 
Russia’. 
However, she does not really address in depth the 
problem of how meanings left to imagination could still 
elicit certain ideas that the Russians held on freedom. 
We should not drop our guard, Humphrey indicates, we 
should not assume that even a good or reasonable 
semantic match allows us access to the same object.
When it comes to ethnographies of freedom in the 
lives of ‘others’, then, if the researcher proposes to grasp 
the existence of freedom as an object of ethnographic 
research, the conditions of possibility for such an object 
to exist need to be somehow established. In most cases, 
researchers are happy to assume that a given meaning 
of freedom (often not spelled out) is a good enough 
theoretical basis to be deployed in their search for 
‘freedom’ (or ‘autonomy’) in the research setting. For 
example, say an anthropologist has the following in 
mind: ‘freedom means X’. Having at some point expe-
rienced this specific ‘X meaning’ of freedom, during 
research, the ethnographer proceeds onward to look for 
objects similar enough to what the meaning ‘X’ allows 
as ‘freedom’. Importantly, this is done independently of 
whether the others involved would necessarily call ‘X’ 
freedom, or not. Therefore, by encountering certain 
‘freedoms’ in the field whose existence was initially 
allowed by ‘X’, the anthropologist proceeds to finding 
out what linguistic sign would best refer to ‘X’ in the 
specific language.
The advantage of this strategy is clear: translation 
becomes a matter of finding an object whose existence 
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is allowed by the imaginative range offered by ‘X’ as 
well as a specific linguistic signifier to be used to refer 
to it. This approach remediates a situation in which 
some people could be argued to have no freedom if 
they do not have the word ‘freedom’ (or an assumed 
direct translation of it) in their language. The disadvan-
tage with this approach, however, is that it assumes a 
priori certain meanings for freedom that are not just 
difficult to spell out, but if they were possible to spell 
out, they would reveal that those ‘X’ meanings attrib-
uted to freedom are often the ones that the anthro-
pologist already knows, and not necessarily meanings 
created by the people with whom the ethnography has 
been conducted. In an extreme scenario we could end 
up with ‘native’ objects and signs for a freedom that 
could have more meaning as ‘freedom’ to people foreign 
to that context than to people in it. It seems at least 
possible that the reiteration of ‘autonomy’ in so many 
settings may indicate a pre-theoretical assumption on 
the part of the anthropologist; but what, in turn, does 
that imply? Some of the assumptions involved seem to 
be directly connected to how the self or subjectivity is 
thought to be constituted and how freedom is expected 
to feature in this constitution.
The subject of freedom
As the last examples show, there are clear dangers in 
assuming too much about what people mean by the 
seemingly shared ideas – ‘freedom’, ‘autonomy’, ‘liberty’. 
Returning specifically to autonomy, firstly, the signifi-
cance of ‘self ’ – the ‘auto-’ in ‘autonomy’ – varies radi-
cally; ethnographic surveys of what a ‘self ’ is offer a 
veritable smorgasbord. To take one instructive case: 
Marriott (1976) has argued that the image of an island-
like individual self in a sea of social activity often 
encountered in Western thought is largely alien to the 
mainstream of Indian culture where instead the view of 
what it means to be human is fundamentally socio-
centric. Self is here not a causal force in its own right 
– it is not the self-propelling soul or autokineton of 
Platonic philosophy – rather its consistency derives 
from the relations from which it is composed. When 
the self becomes isolated from these relations (by 
disease for example) it manifests this not in the form of 
a stripped down or bare individuality, but rather as a 
problematic ‘dividuality’ awaiting personal reintegra-
tion within the social matrix – the soul-body can only 
be made whole again through reconnection with others. 
It turns out that this kind of relational view of the self 
is as widespread in the ethnographic literature as is the 
emphasis on autonomy – but perhaps it is equally as 
prone to problems of translation. In contrast to these 
social-holistic perspectives, Western notions of an 
autonomous self that causes its own free actions seem 
to beg a question regarding what it is that causes this 
capacity for free action (see, for example, Li 2014). The 
special philosophy of ‘free will’ has given a unique twist 
to much European and North American thought, 
especially since the European Enlightenment – fore-
grounding a problem or conflict that seems either 
absent in other worldviews, or as presenting an illusion 
to be overcome, as in Buddhism (Gowans 2003: 25). 
Indeed, Buddhist practices of liberating the self from 
its indebtedness to past and future, ego and other, 
suggest something of a polarity with a Western escha-
tology that understands these relations as precisely 
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constitutive of ethical ‘free will’, as we will see below.
As mentioned, the difficulty of disentangling 
‘freedom’ from the philosophy of ‘free will’ probably 
gives one reason why anthropologists have preferred to 
talk about the ‘autonomy’ of the people they work with 
rather than their ‘freedom’. Certainly, if we are to take 
autonomy to be something like a universally available 
idea, then we will have to cut loose from the assump-
tion that ‘autonomy’ and ‘free will’ are in effect the 
same. The evidence suggests that autonomy offers a 
broad if not consistent foundation for the much more 
historically and culturally specific concept of free will, 
but not the other way round. Nineteenth Century 
teleologists such as Hegel argued that free will was a 
necessary intellectual outcome of the dialectical 
struggle for autonomy at the apex of which is the self-
governance of the fully individuated human being 
within a state. The contemporary position has to be 
much less secure to say the least.
If, then, the dimension of ‘self ’ – the ‘auto’ in 
autonomy – has its own indeterminacy, so too inevi-
tably does the notion of ‘governance’ – νόμος, lawful-
ness – that is the second aspect of the word. The 
problem of ‘lawfulness’ or governance cannot appear in 
the same way for someone who considers their life to 
be self-caused as it does for one who understands their 
personal actions as an outgrowth, or fluxional expres-
sion, of custom or of social relations. Historically, the 
idea of self-government seems often to emerge as a 
reaction to restrictions on following a traditional 
pathway, which in turn gives rise to an assertion of 
positive autonomy or self-determination. Some of the 
social forces involved are captured in this description 
by Lowie of Plains Indian individualism:
The worst Crow insult was to tell a man that he had 
no relatives, for it meant that he was a social nobody 
subject to abuse. To a spirited lad this taunt, however, 
was a challenge: he could court spiritual blessings, 
distinguish himself in fighting, gain wealth, and 
ultimately shame his detractors (Lowie 1954: 124).
It is not ‘free will’ that is being claimed here, though 
this might be implied, what is at issue is the reintegra-
tion of someone back into the mainstream of commu-
nity life, which has been cut off in one direction, by way 
of other kinds of valued relations. We can note, in this 
regard, that in Europe conflicts over religious autonomy 
were rife long before the liberal enlightenment analytic 
of existential freedom gained traction. For example, the 
‘antinomianism’ of sixteenth Century Protestants built 
on centuries of ideological struggle for religious self-
governance vis-à-vis an incomprehensible, exclusive 
and socially distant church hierarchy.
We should expect to find then, despite the broad 
generality of the idea of autonomy that the pragmatic 
contexts and meanings accompanying it vary dramati-
cally. To take one example, for the Papuan Kapauku, 
according to Pospisil (1978: 84-88), individual freedom 
is an all-important cultural idea and this extends into 
how the relationship between soul and body is consti-
tuted – for Kapauku soul and body are autonomous 
agents whose cooperative efforts bring about individu-
ality in the full sense – neither can achieve this on its 
own. A soul can dream in an inert body, bodily action 
can continue even in the absence of awareness, but 
neither soul nor body is a fully conscious person except 
in coalition. If, though, soul and body fail to acknowl-
edge each other’s autonomy this will lead to sickness. 
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Likewise if the individual is forced to work for others, 
or their movements are curtailed by being jailed, these 
restraints can cause fatal illness due to the body’s resist-
ance to compulsion and the effect of this bodily revolt 
on the soul (ibid.). The Kapauku have stood out in the 
ethnographic record as a small-scale society character-
ized by values (individualism, personal freedom, 
commercial competitiveness) more usually vaunted 
amongst business-people in grand-scale commercial 
settings. Despite this seeming cultural familiarity 
though, as Pospisil shows, the integration of autonomy 
into their other cosmological ideas is distinctive.
It is worth noting in this light that the relative 
‘autonomy’ that a given person or community is able to 
claim offers a vital sign of how they are understood and 
valued by others around them. For example, Pipyrou 
(in Lino e Silva and Wardle 2016) demonstrates 
through her research on civil society organizations in 
South Italy how boundaries and processes of author-
izing autonomy are constantly open to extension and 
contraction. Similarly, in a landmark decision, in May 
2015, a New York judge issued a writ of habeas corpus 
on two chimpanzees held at laboratories in a local 
university, Stony Brook. Initially at least, the judgement 
seemed to indicate willingness on the part of the judge 
to acknowledge arguments made by a group advocating 
‘non-human rights’ that the primates were ‘autonomous 
and self-determining being[s]’.2 The debate involved is 
telling at many levels, not least because it seems to take 
for granted that everyone concerned knows what 
‘autonomy’ means in practice and the only remaining 
question is how to extend this idea to ‘non-humans’. As 
we have already observed, this is hardly the case because, 
while autonomy taken loosely has seemingly universal 
valence, its pragmatic and situational ramifications can 
be radically distinctive: so much so that what is viewed 
as a move toward autonomy in one situation can be 
quite literally sickening and soul-destroying in another. 
In Hind Swaraj, Ghandi argues that the large number 
of British women engaged in paid work, and likewise 
the contemporary suffragette movement, was indica-
tive, not of the growing autonomy of women, but 
instead of a deep moral sickness and malaise in a British 
way of life that was, he suggests, bound to destroy itself 
(1909: 24). It may be a necessary feature of any 
particular discourse of freedom that it forecloses as 
much as it opens.
Hence, we might say that, at least in most cultures 
that we are aware of, people seem to agree that 
autonomy is a valuable human (and non-human) good 
for those deemed to deserve it. Nevertheless, both 
cross-culturally and even intra-culturally too, there may 
be little agreement about what this good looks like in 
context, even less in practice. Importantly, this is not a 
problem of semantics only. It is, above all, an ontological 
question.
Possible freedoms
What I am afraid of about humanism is that it 
presents a certain form of our ethics as a universal 
model for any kind of freedom. I think there are 
more secrets, more possible freedoms, and more 
inventions in our future than we can imagine in 
humanism as it is dogmatically represented on every 
side of the political rainbow: the Left, the Centre, 
the Right (Foucault 1988: 15).
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These comments by Foucault contain a degree of 
cryptic optimism as well as elements of a theory about 
the conditions for freedom, both of which demand 
consideration. Foucault takes it as self-evident that 
‘humanism’ and ideas about ‘freedom’ are intercon-
nected historically. However, there are more freedoms 
available than we currently imagine and the connection 
between freedom and ethics can be invented anew; 
either way, humanistic ethics in its current dogmatic 
version has perhaps outlived itself. Sundering humanism 
from freedom, as Foucault elaborates elsewhere, calls 
for a rethinking of the self and the techniques that go 
into creating it.
One response might be that there are already a 
multitude of possibilities present under the word 
‘freedom’; indeed this is perhaps where Malinowski’s 
sense of ‘semantic chaos’ associated with the word 
originates. Freedom, if it is often used interchangeably 
with either autonomy or liberty, has, to say the least, 
very varied ontic resonances of its own. A philological 
approach may help a little in perceiving this underlying 
plurality: ‘freedom’, ‘autonomy’ and ‘liberty’ have 
substantially different derivations and these differences 
in history and usage are suggestive. In English, 
‘autonomy’ indicates a capacity for self-rule, while 
‘freedom’ suggests something else; not only action that 
goes unimpeded, but feelings and behaviour that are 
spirited, generous and whole-hearted. Cognate words 
including ‘frank’ and ‘friendly’ supply insights, as do the 
old Norse word frja, to love, Old Saxon friohan, to 
court or woo, not to mention contemporary Dutch, 
vrijen, to woo or caress. When European philosophies 
of ‘freedom’ first began to be intellectualized in Japan, 
the Dutch word, vrijheid, was transliterated directly 
into Japanese becoming ‘furaheido’; Hideko Mitsui 
shows that this did indeed open up ‘new possibilities’ 
(in Lino e Silva and Wardle 2016).
Liberty, which derives from Latin liber, a free 
person, is rooted etymologically in the idea of growing 
amongst a people (Indo-European, leudh- to grow up; 
people; free (Shipley 1984: 220)). From this viewpoint 
liberties derive from growing with, and hence having 
rights in, a community. By comparison, Humphrey 
notes that svoboda, one of the Russian words translated 
as ‘freedom’ indexes a ‘Svoi’ or ‘We’ who are ‘full 
members of the patriarchal and kin-based community’ 
suggesting something more like the root meaning of 
‘liberty’ than ‘freedom’ (2007: 2, note the resemblance 
with debates around ‘sva’ and ‘swaraj’). ‘Liberty’ has an 
adjectival form, ‘liberal’, but ‘liberal’ and ‘free’ have only 
limited semantic overlap in English. In the case of 
‘liberty’ and ‘autonomy’ the idea of regulation by norm 
or law is a necessary element of the definition, but this 
is not so with ‘freedom’. However, we can add to this 
the complicating fact that ever since the Enlighten-
ment, at least, the liberality of a society has been 
expected to evidence itself in the ‘irregularity, unpre-
dictability and asymmetry’ of its constitutional arrange-
ments (Simmel in Lino e Silva and Wardle 2016: 81).
When, in The Social Contract, Rousseau defines true 
liberty (liberté) as ‘obedience to a law which we prescribe 
to ourselves’ (1963 [1726]: 16) he might equally be 
defining autonomy. Indeed, Kant turns Rousseau’s view 
into his own logic of the autonomous (autonome) will. 
‘Autonomous’ and ‘free’ correspond more closely in 
meaning than ‘free’ and ‘liberal’, but, as we have already 
seen, what they bring to mind is subtly different too. 
‘Free’, draws most directly on the image of a self that is 
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able to do whatever it wants to the fullest extent, whole-
heartedly; liberty evokes, inter alia, the distributive 
rights of a collectivity. Autonomy is as much a mode of 
self-discipline as it is a rejection of external rule. None-
theless post-Enlightenment philosophy has come to 
see ‘freedom’ and ‘moral law’ or ‘ethics’ as inextricably 
linked; it is not only that ‘what makes an act moral also 
makes it free’ (Taylor 1985: 327) but, vice versa, ‘what 
makes an act free also makes it moral’. Not so in 
everyday thought and parlance where ‘freedom’ can 
have non-moral private significance expressed by ‘I’ll 
do as I like’. Nigel Rapport argues that ‘freedom 
encompasses the sense in which individuality exists 
beyond the reach of others’ comprehension’ (in Lino e 
Silva and Wardle 2016: 51), thus also beyond their 
configurations of morality.
When opposed to liberty or autonomy, then, in 
English usage at least, ‘freedom’ appears an unruly and, 
quite literally, underdetermined (or ultimately indeter-
minate) concept around which philosophers and others 
have placed a distinct moral and logical frame. Which-
ever way we look at it, playing up the distinctions and 
slippages between ‘liberty’, ‘autonomy’ and ‘freedom’ 
should remind us, if nothing else, that the words can 
carry unconsidered ontic freight into even the most 
carefully thought-through theoretical discourse. In so 
doing what is shown is that there are already always 
available multiple presences, orientations and ‘possibili-
ties’ for ‘freedom’ of the kind Foucault touches on, 
however vague these may seem. However, this in turn 
takes us to the relation by which ‘what makes an act 
moral also makes it free’ and vice versa; that is to say, 
the philosophy and politics of ‘free will’.
The politics of ‘free will’
Hannah Arendt holds that we have St. Augustine to 
blame for the special status of ‘free will’ in Western 
philosophy (1978). In his Confessions, Augustine sets 
up ‘willing’ as the dimension of self that unifies and 
organises ‘being’ and ‘knowing’ when the time comes to 
act in the world. Only because I will does the awareness 
of what I am and what I know take the shape of a unified 
self that acts definitively. Unlike God, a human self 
cannot know itself absolutely or transcendentally: forced 
to know the world in time, hence blinded from absolute 
truth, the self must depend on its free will to make its 
own path, for good or ill (Arendt 1978: 84-110).
If Arendt is right, then Augustine has bequeathed, 
at least to Westerners, a truly multi-layered epistemo-
logical conundrum. It may be much less easy than we 
might guess to escape some of those humanist ideas 
about freedom that Foucault refers to. Either way, 
Augustine’s argument is further embedded in a much 
deeper and more widely ramifying set of cosmological 
assumptions about the place of human beings in the 
world – at the centre of which is a particular myth of 
origin. Here is how Fromm describes and analyses it:
The biblical myth of man’s expulsion from Paradise 
[…] identifies the beginning of human history with 
an act of choice, but it puts all emphasis on the 
sinfulness of this first act of freedom […]. Man […] 
acts against God’s command, he breaks through the 
state of harmony with nature of which he is part .... 
From the standpoint of the church […] this is sin. 
From the standpoint of man, however, this is the 
beginning of human freedom […] freeing himself 
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from coercion […] committing a sin is […] the first 
human act (Fromm 1965: 49-50).
For humans living in history (that is, acting in time), 
understanding the world begins with a singular choice, 
a free act, a fully human act, also the first sinful act 
because it defies the order of the cosmos. Freedom may 
suggest love, abundance and an enthusiastic state of 
indeterminacy, but, cosmologically speaking, free action 
is sin, defiance and ignorance. As Fromm argues, in 
Abrahamic doctrine, the relationship of divine order 
and human freedom is irretrievably paradoxical. 
Compare the above statement with one derived from 
anthropologist Paul Radin’s fieldwork with a group of 
hunter-agriculturalists, the Winnebago:
The right […] to freedom of expression [amongst 
the Winnebago] is never for a moment questioned 
[…]. Free expression of thought was the order of the 
day and was viewed as a purely private concern, 
system-mongering or a systematic theology, for 
instance, was quite useless […]. It remained the 
expression of a particular man or, at best, of a 
particular group (Radin 1957 [1927]: 57).
As Radin argues, for the Winnebago at least, person-
ally held thoughts and theories posed no particular 
problem to community life. There were in this setting 
no book-based codes of ethics against which freely 
formulated ideas could or should be judged. Either way, 
personally held interpretations had little effect on the 
fundamental needs and flows of social life. Freedom 
was taken for granted, but ‘free will’ did not here arise 
as a distinct question because thinking and acting did 
not happen in the shadow of the Word of God. This, 
he noted, was in stark contrast to those literate cultural 
settings where the written word often takes on the 
aspect of an absolute objectivity against which subjec-
tively held thoughts and actions must be measured and 
judged – with a resultant ‘distortion in our whole 
psychic life’ (Radin 1957 [1927]: 61). In Augustine’s 
and others’ accounts of the experience of monotheism, 
the question, theologically at least, becomes one of how 
to conform out of the finitude of one’s own life to the 
divine word given how little knowledge of God’s inten-
tion is subjectively available. It should be noted that 
while freedom of thought and a high emphasis on 
autonomy in people of the plains like the Winnebago, 
individual actions were policed where they posed a 
threat to communal life – to the food supply in 
particular (compare with Lowie 1954: 126).
As Fortes shows in his analyses of the ancestor-
worshipping Tallensi, the key psychological conun-
drums involved in the notion of free will are not in any 
absolute way confined to monotheistic cultures. Tallensi 
eldest sons worry constantly about whether their deci-
sions and actions are in conformity with the will of 
their male ancestors (1959). However, as Gellner 
likewise indicates, it has been in monotheistic settings 
– where the holy book and the sword combine in a 
single mode of domination – that the paradoxical 
qualities of ‘free will’ have taken on a particularly hard 
political outline (1988). And, as Chris Kelty points out, 
this writing of free-will into the source-code of cultural 
life continues quite literally into the Western present 
through the committed work of internet programmers 
(in Lino e Silva and Wardle 2016). All this is of some 
relevance in thinking about Radin’s case study. If 
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‘freedom of expression’ amongst the Winnebago 
changes little about the social situation – that is, if it 
makes no authentic difference to how people lead their 
social lives – then is it really freedom at all? Malinowski 
(1947) reserves some of his harshest criticism for Boas 
who, along somewhat similar lines, proposes that to be 
free is to feel in harmony with one’s culture (in Anshen 
1942: 379). By that standard, Malinowski responds 
caustically, the person who has fully incorporated Nazi 
indoctrination is free.
Free will, as commentators like Foucault, and indeed 
many others, have pointed out, describes a special 
historical configuration of epistemological concerns 
that defines the situation of freedom in a certain way. 
Even so, it is difficult, looking out at the world from 
within the field where those concerns operate, not to 
question the validity of other understandings of 
freedom. If someone seems to be absent of a kind of 
constraint that I feel in my life (as when Radin describes 
the Winnebago as feeling no restriction on expressing 
their diverse personal worldviews), does that mean that 
they are positively free (see Berlin 1969), or am I simply 
projecting a concern of my own onto their way of life? 
Malinowski confronts (or perhaps parries) this problem 
when he argues that purely subjective understandings 
of freedom, ones based on how or whether people 
imagine themselves to be free or not, can never answer 
the question of the social value of freedom. Freedom 
for Malinowski has the ontological weight of an objec-
tive element of, and an increment in, customary social 
action; what people may or may not think about 
freedom (its semantics) is of little consequence 
compared to what they actually do, how, in other words, 
freedom is built into their patterns of social action.
Here we might respond, based on our previous 
discussion, that Malinowski is really talking less about 
‘freedom’ than about ‘liberty’. Indeed, Malinowski’s view 
of freedom as a social ‘surplus’ available to people who 
share a common language, customs, laws and techniques 
fits exactly with the etymology of ‘liberty’, but rather 
less well with the unruly and charismatic concept of 
freedom. The degree to which mid-Twentieth Century 
social anthropologists thought that the subjective, 
imaginative or existential aspects of freedom were irrel-
evant or detrimental to their concerns is striking. Leach 
(1963) violently disagrees with Malinowski’s function-
alist view of freedom, but he is equally indifferent to 
how people might feel or think about their own 
freedoms; he is only interested in the socially objective 
side – freedom is relevant only as an objective political 
datum or symbol in a given social system. And his 
objective view is a cynical one. The social orientation 
toward freedom is largely a myth though in small-scale 
societies like the Kapauku, the individual can sometimes 
be ‘moderately free because his rulers are incompetent 
rather than because they are benevolent’ (1963: 81). We 
have seen that ‘liberty’ may describe better the public 
and objective aspect of freedom; but we also need room 
to consider freedom in other ways; ways that Leach and 
Malinowski would want to rule out.
It is because subjective freedom has been ruled out 
of discussion that the question of what composes it still 
arises. ‘Free will’ is not the same as subjective ‘freedom’; 
it is a special theory of how human individuality plays 
out in a world where the rules must be somehow 
distinguished ‘through a glass darkly’. The problem 
here is that since anthropologists in the phase of disci-
plinary consolidation ignored subjective experience in 
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favour of analyses of cultural or social pattern, the 
‘freedom’ in ‘free will’ (falling as it does between the 
disciplinary stools of psychology and anthropology) 
remained unexplored (Laidlaw 2014).
Freedom between imagination and bodily 
action
For years, I have dreamed of a liberated anthro-
pology. By ‘liberated’ I mean free from … a system-
atic dehumanizing of the human subjects of study, 
regarding them as the bearers of an impersonal 
‘culture’, or wax to be imprinted with ‘cultural 
patterns’, or as determined by social, cultural or 
social psychological ‘forces’, ‘variables’, or ‘pressures’ 
of various kinds.
Victor Turner (1979: 60).
Victor Turner here reacts strongly against the idea that 
only the objective cultural pattern counts when under-
standing social life. Instead, he invokes the concept of a 
‘liberated anthropology’ where social life is envisaged as 
an unfolding improvisatory drama, rather than as a 
closed system; a drama in which subjective free-play is 
crucial. But, though the counter-modernist ideas that 
Turner talks about have been much discussed in 
anthropology, it is not obvious that they have led to a 
considerably greater critical understanding of the inter-
relationship between ‘cultural patterns’ and freedom as 
a dimension of subjective experience.
Are there ways of understanding these two aspects 
as part of the same picture? Or, are we condemned 
always to divide the subjective from the objective, social 
forces from subjectivity, perhaps inevitably reducing 
one to the other? When we talk about our ‘sense of 
freedom’, that is when we dive into the existential expe-
riencing of freedom in the way that Malinowski wanted 
to rule out, we find that this sense is closely bundled 
with other features of consciousness more broadly. In 
particular our feelings of freedom seem to be bound up 
with the special relation between reflectively imagining 
the world and existing bodily and materially in it. Lev 
Vygotsky gives an illustration of this in his discussion 
of the play-learning of children:
The difference between the practical intelligence of 
children and animals is that children are capable of 
reconstructing their perception and thus freeing 
themselves from the given structure of the f ield 
(Vygotsky 1978: 35, emphasis added).
It is precisely what happens during and immediately 
after this moment of imaginative abstraction that indi-
cates the stage of learning that the child has reached. 
Vygotsky refers to this as the zone of ‘proximal devel-
opment’ (1978: 86). He is working with a classic defini-
tion of play as an imaginative activity, where imagina-
tion is defined as the capacity to re-present something 
in the mind which is at that moment absent to the 
senses. Given what we now know about play amongst 
animals we may question the special status Vygotsky 
awards human infants in this area. However, for the 
purposes of this discussion, Vygotsky is making an 
important link between the feeling and meaning of 
freedom and the capacity to imagine. Play involves 
children in the important imaginative work of ‘freeing 
themselves’ from reality in order to remake it in their 
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own minds. In this way learning entails a sense (and 
sensing) of freedom. For children, play, manipulation 
of the object world is also freedom from the material 
constraints that the world presents – the resistance the 
world presents as a ‘given structure’.
More could be said on how ‘freedom’ is like ‘play’. 
For now, we can note that this insight into the role of 
freedom in subjective experiencing takes us in a very 
different direction to the view (or absence of view) 
provided by classic anthropology that Turner high-
lighted. The special analytical status that Vygotsky 
gives to freedom in combination with imagining is also 
present in a widely held understanding that the most 
easily available kind of freedom takes the form of escape 
into the imagination. This is the purely subjective 
freedom that Malinowski dismisses; but what if imagi-
nation has a crucial role in enabling the public ‘liberties’ 
that he thought were truly important? The processual 
triad that Vygotsky highlights – given reality, imagina-
tive freedom, reconstruction of reality – seems to offer 
vital clues for understanding not only the ontology of 
freedom, but also of liberty and autonomy too.
To illustrate the interpretive difficulties involved, we 
can take a classic case presented to us by Maurice 
Leenhardt. In Do Kamo, Leenhardt (1979 [1947]) 
argues that the Canaques of New Caledonia he lived 
with during the 1900s did not understand human indi-
viduality in the way Europeans generally did. In 
particular, somewhat akin to Marriott’s picture of an 
Indian type of ‘dividual’ and permeable self (see above), 
Canaques did not hold that selfhood implied the 
continuous and exclusive cohabitation of a mind with a 
body through time. To begin with, for them, their 
concepts did not correspond with how Westerners 
might map the actions of a human body in time. For 
example, Leenhardt informs us that when they told 
stories about themselves, rather than recalling spatio-
temporally distant events back to their mind-body in 
the present moment, Canaque story-tellers would send 
their soul or ego out to the places where that event is 
located with their listeners as company. No problem of 
hysteresis or time-dependence for Canaques, then, 
though there is the danger of getting lost (ibid.: 84-85). 
Clearly Canaques understood the capacities of the self 
in an utterly different way to, say, Augustine for whom 
the human ego is thrown contingently into, and must 
reconstitute itself from, the passage of time (which is 
why the universality of ‘free will’ is so crucial a refer-
ence point). However, this does not mean, in contrast, 
that Canaques had no ideas about freedom.
For all the complexity of Canaque concepts of 
human capacity, they seem to have held quite familiar 
ideas about the relationship between the ego who 
imagines a place for itself in the world versus the ‘me’ 
that is constrained by its own bodily presence for others. 
This becomes clearer when Leenhardt describes 
Canaque ideas about suicide:
For them suicide is a method of passing from the 
state of living to the state of bao – a state of invisi-
bility and release from the body, where, liberated 
from the laws of this world, they can increase their 
strength tenfold and at the same time regain their 
dignity by satisfying their need for vengeance 
(Leenhardt 1979 [1947]: 39, emphasis added).
What Leenhardt is indexing with the word ‘body’ in 
this sentence is a little unclear, because he has been 
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explicit otherwise that Canaques do not have a unified 
understanding of the body. However, the general sense 
is plain; freedom most closely corresponds to removal 
of material-bodily constraints in order to give vent to 
certain kinds of desires of the soul-ego; suicide is 
specifically a liberation and way of achieving revenge. 
This is surely freedom as the ability to ‘do what I want’, 
albeit played out in an unfamiliar cosmological frame. 
Leenhardt goes on to point out that highly dramatized 
suicides are widely documented in Melanesian ethnog-
raphy, but they did not represent a death wish as a 
Western reader might have it, because, again, Canaques 
did not understand death to mean an irretrievable end 
of life, more a personal change. In this Canaque drama, 
the soul is pitted against the material constraints of its 
embodied presence in the world and the value this has 
for others. Suicide is an escape by the imagining ego 
from its current material presentation: it involves a loss 
of bodily presence, but importantly also a renunciation 
of accountability to others. There are important clues 
here, it would seem, to what might be a primary type of 
imagined freedom.
In turn the case may call to mind a statement of 
Socrates in the Gorgias, which similarly concerns the 
freedom or independence of the ego from the catego-
ries imposed by society at large:
It would be better for me that my lyre or a chorus 
that I directed should be out of tune and loud with 
discord, and that multitudes of men should disagree 
with me rather than that I, being one, should be out 
of harmony with myself and contradict me (Socrates 
in Arendt 1978: 181).
In other words, a person’s public status is of little 
importance compared to the contradictions that appear 
in one’s understanding of oneself: the difference cannot 
be resolved simply by doing what is publicly demanded. 
Hence, whatever liberties or constraints present them-
selves in the public arena, there is still the freedom of 
the mind to think otherwise and for itself. When 
Socrates talks of ‘being one’ he is, Arendt (1978) 
argues, contrasting this imaginative awareness of unity 
against the ‘chorus’ of multiplying relationships the self 
finds itself caught up in. Only by escaping back into 
conscious reflection can the self reconstruct the given 
structure of its field of action as something meaningful 
for its own life. Socrates is, then, demanding a special 
kind of freedom or autonomy for thought itself.
This kind of capacity for escape into reflective 
awareness – and concomitantly the freedom that 
consciousness feels vis-à-vis its existence for others in a 
publicly shared reality – seems to provide at least one 
fundamental analogy for freedom and autonomy in 
general. Georges Devereux, the psychoanalyst and 
anthropologist, indexes a strong corollary for this when 
he talks of ‘the trauma of the unresponsiveness of 
matter’ (1967: 32-34). He gives the example of Hopi 
mourners slapping the dead and accusing them of 
having died on purpose to grieve their survivors. The 
soul is here understood as having maliciously used its 
subjective freedom or autonomy to leave the world 
where it should be accountable to those around it. The 
logic is not only close to that presented by the egoistic 
suicide of the Canaques, or Kapauku ideas about the 
mutual autonomy of soul and body, it reiterates the 
fundamental issue that consciousness is aware of a kind 
of freedom in its own thoughts, desires et cetera that is 
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in contrast to the relative unresponsiveness it encoun-
ters as a bodily presence in the material world. The 
words of a young American to Fred Alford point once 
more to this fissure:
‘My cubicle at work is like a jail cell. My boss is a 
tyrant. But in a way it doesn’t matter. I can think 
what I want about him, about work, about anything. 
In my mind I’m free’.
Do you ever wish you were a little less free in your 
mind, and a little freer at work? I asked.
‘I never thought of it that way’, replied Sandra. ‘One 
doesn’t really have much to do with the other, does 
it?’ (Alford 2005: 14).
Recognising this kind of subjective freedom certainly 
does not contradict Malinowski’s view that liberties are 
more than mere thought-stuff; for freedom to corre-
spond to something actual we must have freedoms, or 
lack them, in our lives in the world, not merely in our 
ruminations or imaginings. However, perhaps Vygotsky 
provides us with the factor that links the two sides of 
the ontological-semantic impasse. Sure enough, the 
ruminative freedom of the Canaque, or of cubicle 
worker Sandra, to escape out of their material circum-
stances into the unconstrained life of the soul or ego is 
a recognizable, if a one-sided, freedom; but what of the 
freedom the child experiences as it plays, who steps out 
of the ‘given structure of the field’ in order to reorder, 
and then re-enter, that field? In this case the freedom 
has both a reflective escapist side and an intentional 
active one – freedom here presents itself not only in the 
act of reimagining the perceptual field, but also as an 
effect in the world, an ontological change to the world. 
And this is not just a useful description of the role of 
freedom in childhood play-learning but also of the 
effects of imagination-led action in general: there can 
exist a productive relationship between imagined free-
doms and practicably attainable liberties.
Towards an ontological understanding of 
freedom
Regarding the very pragmatic puzzles that ethno-
graphic research into freedom presents, an ontological 
approach can prove helpful. Awareness of the existence 
of freedom seems often to start from the presence of a 
signifier of freedom in the concrete research context, 
extending from there into the various meanings that 
freedom acquires in daily use. Since freedom appears in 
so many configurations, our approach to the variable 
philosophies and metaphysics of freedom must be both 
anti-foundational and pragmatic in William James’ 
sense (1975). Freedom, autonomy and liberty can 
participate in many and radically diverse projects of 
‘world-making’ (Goodman 1978)
The historical focus of anthropology on the impor-
tance and precedence of symbolic and linguistic 
meaning has left discussions over the ontological 
dimensions of the ethnographic enterprise underex-
plored when it comes to freedom. Ethnography, as an 
empirical way of knowing, could be (and has recently 
become) much more attuned to ontological concerns. 
This offers a partial response to the problems that 
Derrida (1997) and others have identified with ‘the 
metaphysics of the logos’. Derrida argues that in a 
logocentric metaphysics ‘The word is ... already a 
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constituted unity’. In a logocentric framing the thing 
signified is welded into an ‘apparently innocent propo-
sition’ in this way becoming available for metaphysical 
reflection (ibid.: 93). However, we need to resist this 
seemingly unavoidable unity of word and thing because 
when our metaphysics becomes ‘logocentric’ other 
concurrent plural qualities and imaginative connota-
tions of freedom hide themselves. Indeed, as Derrida 
indicates, conflation of word and thing is likely to be 
far from ‘innocent’; it may make it impossible to speak 
certain freedoms at all. Beyond words there is the 
bodily-imaginative practice of life: hence our emphasis 
in the title of our recent volume on ‘freedom in practice’ 
(Lino e Silva and Wardle 2016).
What, then, finally, is the relationship between the 
word ‘liberada’ (as in ‘travesti liberada’) and ‘liberty’ or 
‘freedom’, or ‘wayegreru’ and ‘slave’ as experiences of 
life? An important aim in any exploration of freedom 
from an anthropological perspective should be to 
understand what people with whom we share our 
enterprise, think and how they live freedom themselves. 
In order to reach an understanding of how freedom is 
experienced by an ‘other’ (beyond oneself ), an onto-
logical discussion about the basis for our understanding 
is surely desirable. Quoting Quine (1981: 2): ‘Little can 
be done in the way of tracking thought processes except 
when we can put words to them. For something objec-
tive that we can get our teeth into we must go after the 
words’. In this sense, words, and language in general, 
can be used as a means both to frame and to enter a 
variety of dimensions regarding the existence of 
freedom – beyond meaning. We may find that ‘freedom’ 
as logos is indexing precisely the authorizing ‘rule’ that 
freedom as free-play is intent on bending, extending, 
reshaping – or breaking. The terminology used – 
‘liberty’, ‘freedom’, ‘autonomy’ may, indeed, be being 
deployed to hide some other or further unvoiced 
proximal claim about, or potential for, being human.
Regarding the apparent vagueness of a definition of 
freedom on ontological grounds, we argue that all 
specific individuatives tend to be vague. This seems to 
be a characteristic of words in general. For example, 
terms such as ‘dog’ or ‘desk’ are also very vague. Many 
different objects and qualities of objects go under the 
name ‘desk’. As Quine (1981: 13) reminds us, ‘this is 
vagueness only of classification and not of existence’. 
The fact that the most varied different physical objects 
count as ‘desks’ is not a problem for the existence of 
desks. Equally, the fact that the most varied actions, 
concepts, and life events could come to be counted as 
instances of freedom, is not in itself a problem. Quite 
the contrary, this could be a remedy to some of the 
unwanted consequences that follow from restrictive 
semantic definitions of freedom, alongside the over-
bearing power that certain meanings of freedom tend 
to assume at the expense of others. Quine (1981) has 
famously argued that no translation can absolutely 
determine meaning, and that no metaphysical theory 
can exclusively determine existence. The ontological 
definition of freedom proposed here extends the hope 
that freedom may come to exist under a variety of 
understandings, that it can assume a wide variety of 
meanings, even various, conflicting and contradictory 
ones. From here we may gain access to the further 
‘possible freedoms’ that Foucault refers to. Such a radical 
understanding of the complexities of freedom as lived 
experience can only be achieved when freedom has 
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